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ABSTRACT 
  
“The concern of this Court is that in these 
lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and 
factual defenses are not being litigated, and 
instead, the federal judiciary is being used as 
a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to 
pound settlements out of unrepresented 
defendants.” –Judge S. James Otero2
 
   
Current procedural rules have failed to keep up with 
trends in intellectual property litigation.  The rise of 
digital media, the use of the Internet for mass distribution, 
and the increasing vigor with which copyright proprietors 
protect their legal interests has led to an increase in 
litigation on behalf of corporate plaintiffs against 
dispersed, non-commercial defendants.  These cases take 
advantage of a procedural oversight, one which affords 
plaintiffs the ability to aggregate their cases against 
dispersed defendants who are unable to utilize a common 
defense. A class defense would level the playing field 
between plaintiffs and defendants, avoid default 
judgments, and protect defendants with valid defenses 
from settling negative expected value suits.   
 
                                                     
1 Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2010; University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, B.A. 2005.  I thank my family for their support through 
undergraduate and law school, and the editors of the Duke Law and Technology 
Review for their efforts.  Any errors are my own.   
2 Decision and Order to Show Cause, Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. 
O‘Brien, No. 06-5289 (C.D.Cal. March 2, 2007) (ordering RIAA plaintiffs to 
show cause why case should not be dismissed as to defendant).    
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The Digital Age and the rise of the Internet ushered 
many changes to American life.  Among them is an 
increasingly common litigation paradigm: powerful 
commercial plaintiffs sue many dispersed, noncommercial 
defendants.  While substantive law struggles to keep up with 
changes in technology,3
¶2 Part I of this iBrief discusses the peculiar structure 
which the recording industry's litigation against end-users has 
taken: where plaintiffs are concentrated and defendants are 
dispersed.  Part II explains how the recording industry has 
developed a litigation strategy which replicates a private mass 
tort adjudication system.  Part III touches on the economic 
ramifications of an individual defendant choosing to defend a 
lawsuit.  Parts IV and V introduce the class defense and 
briefly explain how it may be employed by defense counsel to 
aggregate the claims of noncommercial defendants. 
 procedural law is even more deficient 
in coping with this new paradigm. 
I.  CONCENTRATED PLAINTIFFS, DISPERSED DEFENDANTS 
¶3 Many corporations measure their wealth not by how 
many assembly lines or natural resources they own, but rather 
by how much intellectual property they possess.  The rise of 
digital media and the Internet is a double-edged sword for 
these companies.  The Internet presents an opportunity to 
lower the costs of distribution. However, it also increasingly 
exposes electronic media to copyright infringement, which 
diminishes the value of their capital goods.   
¶4 In September 2003, ten corporations, including the six 
largest film studios and the four largest recording studios, 
launched the most expansive litigation campaign ever, acting 
as plaintiffs against tens of thousands of unidentified 
                                                     
3 See, e.g., Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F.Supp.2d 793, 797 (M.D. La. 2007) 
(“Given the rate at which Internet technologies evolve, the ability of computer 
hackers to stay two-steps ahead of the latest in online security, and the 
comparatively slow speed at which the law responds to cyber-security threats, 
neither Louisiana courts nor the Fifth Circuit have confronted the issue before 
us.”).  
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defendants.4
¶5 Initially, the plaintiffs were successful in their 
litigation strategy against non-commercial, and often 
unrepresented, defendants.  Most of these individual 
defendants lacked the resources to litigate potentially valid 
claims.
  They alleged that thousands of individuals 
violated the Copyright Act by trading digital copies on peer-
to-peer online networks.   
5  Many of these actions were ex parte proceedings.6
¶6 The typical end-user lawsuits were filed against Doe 
defendants in districts where an Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) had a server.
  
These cases represent a unique form of litigation:  one 
plaintiff initiates litigation against a large number of 
defendants for a small sum in each suit.  The plaintiff is a 
sophisticated corporate entity and the dispersed defendants 
are typically individual, non-commercial users. 
7  Often 200 or more individual cases were 
aggregated into a single action.8   The filing was usually 
followed by a motion for immediate discovery and subpoenas 
served on the ISPs, which allowed the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), an industry trade group to 
which the plaintiffs belong, to convert IP addresses into file-
sharer identities.  The average, non-negotiable settlement, 
standardized by the RIAA, was approximately $3,000.9
                                                     
4 See Press Release, RIAA, Recording Industry Begins Suing File Sharers Who 
Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), available at 
   
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_month_filter=9&news_year_filter=20
03&resultpage=2&id=85183A9C-28F4-19CE-BDE6-F48E206CE8A1.   
5 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D. Minn. 
2008) (represented pro bono).   
6 See, e.g., Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D. Kan. 
2008); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Does 1-3, 371 F.Supp.2d 377 (W.D. N.Y. 
2005).   
7 David Opderbeck, Peer-To-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and 
Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1685, 1705 (2005).  
8 Id. at 1704; see also Press Release, RIAA, RIAA Brings New Round of 
Lawsuits Against 751 Online Music Thieves (Dec. 15, 2005), available at  
http://riaa.org/newsitem.php?news_month_filter=&news_year_filter=2005&resu
ltpage=&id=2E9599A7-91FB-739F-CACB-77EE7118AF1C. 
9 See Transcript of Q&A with RIAA President Cary Sherman, DAILY TEXAN, 
March 25, 2004, available at 
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¶7 These suits were never intended for trial.  They were 
intended to deter future file-sharing more than they were 
intended to obtain money damages.10  According to one 
attorney, in 40,000 RIAA cases against end-users, the RIAA's 
investigator was never deposed and only once was the RIAA's 
expert deposed.11  In that deposition, the RIAA expert 
admitted that neither he nor the investigator could withstand a 
Daubert hearing for admissibility if these cases were to go to 
trial.12
¶8 Most file sharing actions ended in a take-it-or-leave-it 
settlement agreement, unreviewed by any court.
 
13  Most 
content actions, typically aimed at non-commercial users of 
YouTube and MySpace, have been resolved with Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) take-down notices. This 
resulted in material being removed from the Internet which 
under existing copyright law created no liability for the 
defendant.14  Commentators noted that “RIAA end-user 
litigation appears to be nearly the opposite of mass tort 
litigation. . . . [And the] structure of the litigation is inverted.  
[While] mass torts typically involve numerous consumers 
suing big business, [sic] the RIAA litigation involves big 
business suing numerous consumers.”15
¶9 The RIAA's end-user litigation strategy highlights the 
lack of procedural protections afforded to dispersed 
defendants.  These defendants face the same collective action 
and economic disincentives to litigate as typical class 
plaintiffs.  However, dispersed defendants are not afforded 
the same procedural protections as dispersed plaintiffs, even 
when they meet the common criteria that bind a plaintiff 
   
                                                                                                                       
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/media/paper410/news/2004/03/25/Focus/Tran
script.Of.Qa.With.Riaa.President.Car-641217.shtml. 
10 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 962–63 
(Breyer, J., concurring); see also  Press Release, RIAA, RIAA Continues 
Enforcement of Rights With New Lawsuits Against 784 Illegal File Sharers 
(June 29, 2005), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062905.asp. 
11 Ray Beckerman, Content Holders v. The Web: 2008 US Copyright Law 
Victories Point to Robust Internet, 12 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 16, 20, 2009. 
12 Id. at 20. 
13 Opderbeck, supra note 7, at 1689. 
14 Id. at 1705. 
15 Id. at 1702–03.   
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class.  As a result, some defendants have valid defenses, but 
choose to settle because litigation would be cost prohibitive.  
While the factual situation of end-user litigation can be 
thought of as the opposite of a mass tort, the judicial system's 
handling of the problem is radically different.  The remedy 
would be a method of aggregating defense claims. 
II. THE RIAA'S PRIVATE MASS TORT SYSTEM 
¶10 End-user litigation is, in many ways, the opposite of 
traditional mass tort litigation.  Both situations present a 
single party adverse to many small, dispersed parties.  Also, 
the single party has an advantage of scale and avoids the 
collective action problem.16
¶11 In fact, the RIAA's litigation strategy can be 
characterized as a mass tort action and resolution system: the 
recording industry plaintiff files large bundled claims, obtains 
all of the relevant discovery in one judicial forum, and then 
settles individual claims on standardized terms.  By contrast, 
in a conventional mass tort, the plaintiffs band together with 
the power of a class action and often negotiate a settlement 
with the defendant.  Settling defendants are typically released 
of all past and future claims, and in some instances the global 
settlements allow them to avoid regulatory shut-down or 
bankruptcy.
  This imbalance provides a 
disincentive for dispersed parties to litigate, and may lead to 
unfavorable settlements or to neglecting valid legal claims. 
17
¶12 By permitting claims against non-residents of the 
forum state
  In contrast, the end-user copyright defendant 
pays $3000 to receive a “promise” instead of a legally binding 
release from future lawsuits for activity prior to the 
settlement.   
18 and issuing discovery orders,19
                                                     
16 See, ¶15, infra.  
 most district 
17 See Joseph Rice & Nancy Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: 
Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort 
Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405 (1999); see, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, 
November 1998, available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa 
(settling tort claims between four cigarette producers and Attorneys General 
from forty six states); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 883 (1999) 
(proposing settlement to avoid defendant's bankruptcy).   
18 See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating it is likely that Doe defendants were not residents, 
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courts have tacitly endorsed this litigation strategy. Some 
courts, however, have issued orders severing these cases for 
improper joinder of claims.20  Of the severing courts, some 
have noted in the accompanying order that the RIAA may 
have consciously attempted to avoid paying separate filing 
fees.21  Judges who have severed cases usually cite Rule 
20(a)(2)(A), which requires the right to relief to arise “out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences.”22  Since there was no allegation that the Doe 
defendants were acting together or in a series of transactions, 
these courts reasoned that joinder was inappropriate.23
¶13 End-user litigation will likely increase as content 
providers become increasingly concerned about piracy of 
their products.
   
24
                                                                                                                       
however personal jurisdiction arguments were premature).  Due to the cost of 
filing a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or a motion 
for forum non conveniens, most claims are settled rather than litigated.   
 If so, the procedural asymmetry between 
plaintiffs and defendants will continue to be exacerbated by 
the lack of procedural structures addressing the imbalance 
between a single, powerful plaintiff and dispersed, non-
commercial defendants.   
19 See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Does 1-6, No. 04-1241, 2004 U.S. 
Dist.  LEXIS 22673 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2004) (authorizing expedited discovery to 
“all current and future cases filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania” related 
to the above-captioned case). 
20 See, e.g., Order, Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-
22DAB (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2004); Order, BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. 04-
650 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2004); Order at 3, Motown Record Co., L.P. v. Does 1-
252, No. 1:04-CV-439-WBH (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2004); Order at 8-9, Arista v. 
Does 1-100, No. 1:04-CV-2495-BBM (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2005).   
21 See e.g., In re Cases Filed By Recording Companies 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA_v_ThePeople/20041117_austin_severance_order
.pdf (stating “The filing fees for the recent four cases totaled $600, whereas the 
filing fees of 254 separate cases would have been $38,100. That is a significant 
loss of revenue to the public coffers,” before dismissing charges against 250 of 
the defendants sua sponte.).  See also Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11, No. 
1:07-2828, 2008 WL 4823160 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (under Rule 21 a judge may 
sua sponte rule on the joinder issue before any other, and that postponing a 
ruling on joinder results in lost revenue approaching a million dollars and 
encourages music industry plaintiffs to continue misjoining defendants).   
22 See id.   
23 See id. 
24 Opderbeck, supra note 7 at 1689. 
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 009 
¶14 Consolidation or aggregation of the dispersed claims 
would level the playing field between plaintiffs and 
defendants.  Currently, however, only plaintiffs have a 
functional aggregation device.25
III. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE TO LITIGATE 
  Because of the lack of 
procedural protection for dispersed defendants, the judicial 
system has inadvertently established a near-absolute liability 
regime.  All that a commercial plaintiff must do is threaten to 
sue dispersed end-users and then collect settlement payments.   
¶15 Dispersed plaintiffs use class actions to overcome the 
collective action problem faced by numerous individuals who 
have all suffered a similar harm perpetrated by a common 
defendant.   In many instances these individual harms are too 
small to make litigation a viable option, either because the 
economic value of each claim is low or because the plaintiffs 
are seeking injunctive relief instead of monetary 
compensation. The aggregation provided by the class action 
device, embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, allows plaintiffs to bring suits with low individual 
economic value.26  A multitude of low-value claims may be 
aggregated to make litigation economically worthwhile.  One 
court explained that without a plaintiffs’ class action, a 
powerful corporate defendant could knowingly overcharge 
each customer by a small amount, “fully aware that relatively 
few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies,” that those 
remedies will not have a collateral estoppel effect, and that 
“[t]he potential for millions of customers to be overcharged 
small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot 
be ignored.”27
¶16 Defendants in traditional class actions are also able to 
reduce their cost of litigation through economies of scale 
when multiple lawsuits share common questions of law or 
   
                                                     
25 See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CAL. L. REV. 
685, 689, 696-708 (2005) (hypotheticals and case studies which “vividly 
demonstrate the failure of the existing legal regime to adequately protect 
dispersed defendants.”). 
26 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980) 
(recognizing that the class device enables plaintiffs “to bring cases that for 
economic reasons would not be brought”). 
27 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).   
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fact.  For example, defendants can pay once and then reuse 
much of the same research, memoranda, and experts when 
there are common questions between claims.  This allows the 
defendant to spread its litigation costs across multiple 
lawsuits.   
¶17 This aggregative effect allows a plaintiff class of 
Davids to form their own litigation Goliath.  Thousands of 
small claims against a common defendant are  litigated in one 
action, creating economies of scale for the plaintiffs and 
converting negative expected value claims into positive 
expected value ones.   
¶18 However, the contrary paradigm has garnered 
relatively scant academic attention.28
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO REMEDY THE DISPARITY 
  In end-user litigation, 
multiple dispersed defendants have allegedly all wronged a 
single plaintiff in the same way, with common questions of 
law pervading each tortious action.  Why have dispersed 
defendants not been allowed to pool their litigation resources 
as well?   
¶19 End-users may have a variety of valid defenses, such 
as actual innocence or fair use; however, it is economically 
unfeasible for them to litigate as defendants.  Once they enter 
into the form settlement agreement offered by the RIAA, they 
are prevented from later suing as plaintiffs.  This contrasts 
with a class plaintiff who can choose to pay an overcharge 
and decide to sue for recovery later.   
¶20 The modern class action has become a vital part of 
complex civil litigation, addressing problems that involve 
fewer than twenty-five29 plaintiffs to tens of millions.30
                                                     
28 See, e.g., Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 689 (recognizing that both 
academics and policymakers have focused on the collective action problems of 
plaintiffs more than defendants). 
  Not 
only does it level the playing field between dispersed 
plaintiffs and powerful defendants by remedying the 
collective action problem and making litigation economically 
29 See, e.g., Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 87 F.R.D. 26, 29–30 (N.D. Ga. 
1980) (twenty-three class members sufficient). 
30 See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) 
(estimated plaintiff class of fifty million).   
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attractive, it also allows the rapid resolution of large numbers 
of claims at one time.31
A.  Some defendants are not liable 
 Without a class action to aggregate 
dispersed plaintiffs, defendants are effectively immunized 
from suit.  In the case of end-user litigation, the lack of an 
aggregation device effectively immunizes the plaintiff from 
actual litigation and instead approaches an absolute fault 
system.   
¶21 Plaintiffs would not be able to establish liability in 
some of the lawsuits filed if a procedural solution allowed 
defendants with legitimate defense to litigate for reasonable 
costs.  As a result of this deficiency, defendants end up 
settling even though they may have a valid defense under 
present law. 
¶22 For example, the RIAA has misidentified the user and 
sued a parent, when the infringing download was actually 
committed by an adult child using the same computer.32  The 
defendant may have already bought the copyrighted materials 
in another form, such as a CD or DVD.  In another case of 
mistaken identity, the RIAA sued a deceased grandmother.33  
In other cases, the defendant may have a valid fair-use 
defense; such as access to the same materials at a school 
library, which were ultimately incorporated into a project or 
teaching aid.34  Another plausible defense is that the statutory 
damages available under the Copyright Act, intended for 
commercial infringement, are unconstitutionally excessive 
when compared to the actual damages suffered by the 
plaintiff.35
                                                     
31 See, e.g., Deborah Hensler & Thomas Rowe, Beyond “It Just Ain't Worth It”: 
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 137 (2001).    
  A defendant could also raise the affirmative 
32 Capitol Records Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W., 2007 WL 1028532 
(W.D. Ok. Feb. 6, 2007) (awarding reasonable attorney's fees to misidentified 
parent).   
33 See Toby Coleman, Deceased Woman Named in File-sharing Suit, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 2005, at P1A. 
34 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110 (2006).  Fair use is a judicial doctrine which has 
been codified and includes whether the use is commercial and the effect of the 
use on the potential market for the work.    
35 See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F.Supp.2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 
2008) (“The defenses which have possible merit include: (1) whether the 
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defense that the coordinated behavior of the plaintiffs 
amounts to copyright misuse.36
¶23 One proposed solution to remedy this procedural 
asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants is the class 
defense.  This would act as a parallel device to the plaintiffs' 
class action, but instead would allow a lead defendant to step 
forward, argue for certification of a class, and consolidate 
defendants' claims. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[o]ne 
great advantage of class action treatment of mass tort cases is 
the opportunity to save the enormous transaction costs of 
piecemeal litigation.”
  Nevertheless, it is rare that 
these issues are ever litigated because the economies of scale 
tip so favorably towards the copyright proprietor plaintiff.  
The result is that scholars have little reliable information 
regarding the facts of each case or statistics regarding how 
many defendants may have succeeded on the merits. 
Accordingly, only the most blatant cases of mistaken identity 
have come to light.   
37
¶24 The text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which 
governs class actions, does not preclude a defendant class.  It 
plainly states that members of a class “may sue or be sued as 
  Consolidation also benefits the court 
system. By converting defendants' negative expected value 
suits into ones that may have a positive expected value, the 
court system may resolve these cases without resulting to 
mass default judgments.  
                                                                                                                       
amount of statutory damages available under the Copyright Act, measured 
against the actual money damages suffered, is unconstitutionally excessive.”); 
see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, No. CV-05-1095(DGT), 2006 WL 
3335048 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2006) (recognizing that plaintiff sought damages of 
$750.00 per song; over 1,000 times more the economic actual damages 
suffered); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. 04-1671 MHP, 2005 WL 
1287611, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) (“[L]arge awards of statutory damages 
can raise due process concerns. . . . Extending the reasoning of Gore and its 
progeny, a number of courts have recognized that an award of statutory damages 
may violate due process if the amount of the award is ‘out of all reasonable 
proportion’ to the actual harm caused by a defendant's conduct.”).  
36 See, e.g.,  Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 
647 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The doctrine of misuse ‘prevents copyright holders from 
leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the 
monopoly.’”) (citation omitted). 
37 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 860 (1999). 
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representative parties on behalf of all members.”38
¶25 Under Rule 23 there are four prerequisites that govern 
all class cases:   
  If 
defendants are able to be sued together, what prevents them 
from being able to defend together?   
• the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable 
• there are questions of law or fact common to the class 
• the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and  
• the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class  
 
¶26 The first prong, numerosity, is clearly met.  In many 
instances, RIAA plaintiffs have attempted to join hundreds of 
defendants into the same suit.39  Instead of joining defendants 
and facing severability,40 the cases could remain bundled 
together if certified as a class.41
¶27 The second prong of the test requires common issues 
of law or fact to be present among the class.   All class 
members would share at least one question of law, such as 
whether the “making available” theory
   
42
                                                     
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 pursued by the 
RIAA was a copyright infringement, or whether an actual 
upload to another user on a peer-to-peer network was required 
to violate the distribution right.  Some class members would 
share common affirmative defenses; some may be innocent of 
39 See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
40 See id. 
41 See, e.g., Armstead v. Pingree, 629 F.Supp. 273, 278–79 (M.D. Fla. 1986) 
(under the numerosity prong “[t]he primary focus is whether joinder of the 
proposed class members is impracticable.”).   
42 ‘Making available’ was a theory of copyright infringement based on 
infringing the exclusive distribution right of the copyright owner.  See Elektra v. 
Barker, (2008 WL 857527) (rejecting RIAA's “making available” theory); see 
also RIAA “Making Available” Theory Rejected, SLASHDOT, April 1, 2008, 
available at http://news.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/04/01/1822246. 
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any infringement, some may have various fair-use defenses, 
and all could raise a common defense of copyright misuse.43
¶28 The third prong, requiring that the defenses be typical 
among class members, could be resolved with the use of 
defendant subclasses.   Rule 23(c)(5) explicitly states that a 
class may be subdivided into separate subclasses, each treated 
as its own class.  One subclass could be raised for each fair-
use defense, and all members could join in a subclass raising 
copyright misuse, unconstitutionality of the statutory damages 
when applied to noncommercial users, and the legal viability 
of the ‘making available’ theory, among others.   
 
¶29 The forth prong, adequacy of representation, would 
probably require each subclass to have separate 
representation; thus ensuring that subclass counsel were not 
conflicted.44
¶30 Finally, a court should prefer certification of the 
defendant class because, without class status, dispersed 
defendants will prefer default judgments or adhesion 
settlements instead of protecting their legal rights.
  With separate subclass counsel, a class defense 
should easily satisfy this requirement.   
45 Cases 
will still be manageable through redefining the class and 
subclasses.46
B.  Why has a Class Defense not been Employed? 
   
                                                     
43 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 
191, 204 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The misuse doctrine extends from the equitable 
principle that courts ‘may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is 
using the right asserted contrary to the public interest.’” (quoting Morton Salt 
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942))). 
44 See 5 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.25(5)(e), at 23–149 
(3d ed. 1998) (plaintiff subclass attorney may not serve as class counsel for all 
subclasses).   
45 See Section III, supra. 
46 Bryant Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Prospective, 
77 NW. U. L. REV. 492, 527 (1982) (“Courts should prefer certification . . . when 
an accountable legal rights entity represents the class, the class is too diffuse to 
enforce its rights by any other means, or the court can manage dissent through 
such mechanisms as subclassing, redefining the class, permitting the 
intervention, and structuring the remedy.”). 
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¶31 Two major stumbling blocks to the class defense have 
been identified: due process concerns for absentee defendants, 
and incentives for class attorneys.47
1.  Due Process Concerns for Absentee Defendants. 
      
¶32 The landmark Supreme Court decision in Hansberry 
v. Lee has informed our class action jurisprudence for almost 
seventy years.48  The Court outlined the general principal that 
a party not properly before the adjudicative body is not bound 
by a judgment from that body.49  However, the Court 
recognized an exception to the rule in a class action where the 
absentee members had their interest adequately represented 
by the class.50  The Court, recognizing that aggregation was 
an accepted part of a court's equity powers, stated that the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would only be offended 
“in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure 
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent 
parties who are bound by it.”51  Thus, the absence of a class 
member, who cannot voice an opinion in court, is not the 
relevant inquiry.  Under Hansberry, the inquiry is whether the 
processes employed fairly protect the interests of the absent 
party.52  Expanding on Hansberry, the Supreme Court later 
stated that, for a money judgment to bind absentees, the 
process must include notice, an opportunity to be heard, the 
right to opt out, and adequate representation.53    The process 
must be “so devised and applied as to insure that those 
present are of the same class as those absent and that the 
litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair 
consideration of the common issue.”54
                                                     
47 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 710. 
  The class defendants 
do not have to be present. However, they must be afforded the 
48 See William Katt, Res Judicata and Rule 19, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 423–24 
(2009).   
49 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general 
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a 
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or 
to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”). 
50 Id. at 43. 
51 Id. at 42. 
52 See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 800-02 (1996).   
53 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).   
54 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43.   
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opportunity to be present, and ensured that if they remain 
absent, their interests will be adequately represented.   
¶33 The opt-out mechanism, required by Phillips 
Petroleum, mollifies due process concerns in plaintiff class 
actions, but would need to be slightly adjusted for the class 
defense.  An opt-out process similar to a plaintiff class action 
would unreasonably burden defendants by requiring them to 
disclose their identities.  This positive act would identify 
them to the plaintiff and invite a personal lawsuit.  However, 
confidential opt-out lists would prevent the disclosure of 
members who wish to remain anonymous.55
¶34 Due process would also require notice, reasonably 
tailored, be given to current and potential defendants. 
  Opt-outs could 
be filed and remain under seal.   
56
¶35 Still, the stakes for losing a lawsuit are qualitatively 
different for plaintiffs than defendants.  A class plaintiff is 
losing a hypothetical benefit, which, without the class action, 
would never have inured to them.  The class defendant, 
however, may suffer being bound to a monetary judgment 
without knowledge of, much less participation in, the 
litigation process.  While there is a logical economic 
argument that the potential gain to a class plaintiff is little 
different than a potential loss to a class defendant,
  
Since future defendants lack any incentive to step forward 
and acknowledge that they may have illegally infringed a 
copyright, overlapping layers of directed notice and public 
notice would be preferred.  For example, notice could be 
given, through email, to all registered members of YouTube, 
MySpace, or all Internet users at a particular university.  After 
notice, reasonably tailored to reach the defendant class is 
delivered, a court could proceed to accept confidential opt-
outs under seal, provide the right to be heard to those seeking 
it, and then proceed to judgment.   
57
                                                     
55 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 725. 
 many 
judges may be uncomfortable entering a judgment that would 
require absent parties to pay substantial out-of-pocket 
expenses as soon as the plaintiff identifies them.   
56 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
57 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 719. 
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¶36 The qualitative difference in a hypothetical benefit 
and an unexpected monetary judgment may seem, alone, to be 
an insurmountable obstacle to the class defense.  However, at 
least as early as 1853, the Supreme Court authorized the 
division of a common church pension, and stated it was “well 
established” that a bill in equity could be maintained against 
absentee defendants, so long as they were represented.58  The 
Court later reaffirmed this principle; that the equity powers 
extend to bind the property of absent defendants.59
2.  Compensating class counsel  
  While the 
reduction of funds in a pension is not the same as a judgment 
seeking payment, Swormstedt and Brusselback infer that 
plaintiffs can receive funds from absent defendants.  Indeed, 
this was a not-uncommon power exercised under the Federal 
Equity Rules.  
¶37 Another stumbling block for the class defense is that a 
successful defense, in a suit for money damages, results in no 
money changing hands at all.  Thus, class attorneys would not 
be able to work on a contingency fee basis as plaintiffs' class 
counsel often do.  One option would be to create a one-sided 
fee shifting rule.  Prevailing defendants would be entitled to 
the award of attorneys' fees, but not prevailing plaintiffs.  
Such a measure, however, would have to be created 
legislatively or judicially imposed.60  Conveniently, many 
federal statutes, including the Copyright Act, already contain 
fee-shifting provisions.61
 
  
V.  THE NEXT STEP: PUTTING THE CLASS DEFENSE INTO PRACTICE 
¶38 The application of Rule 13 Counterclaims and Rule 
24(c)(5) subclasses to the class defense makes the device 
                                                     
58 See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 300-304 (1853). 
59 See Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938) ( “The omission 
from [Equity] Rule 48 . . . of the phrase ‘. . . the decree shall be without 
prejudice to the rights and claims of all absent parties,’ preserved unimpaired the 
jurisdiction of federal courts of equity in a class suit to render a decree binding 
upon absent defendants affecting their interest in property within the jurisdiction 
of the court.”). 
60 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 714-17. 
61 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
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more palatable.  A counterclaim effectively puts the 
defendant into the shoes, or the posture, of a plaintiff.62
¶39 RIAA end-user litigation, as well as many other 
potential end-user litigation situations, is based on the 
Copyright Act.  Section 101 of the Copyright Act, codified at 
17 U.S.C. § 505, provides that the prevailing party in 
copyright litigation may be awarded attorney's fees, as well as 
costs.  Compared to many fee-shifting statutes, § 505 treats 
both plaintiffs and defendants equally and allows for awards 
in either direction; it does not require a showing of 
frivolousness for an award to a prevailing defendant.
  
Counterclaims seeking declaratory judgments would also 
alleviate many of the problems raised as potential hurdles to 
the class defense.   
63
¶40 Counterclaims also resolve some of the due process 
issues raised.  Since only a declaratory judgment would 
sometimes be sought, ascertaining the absolute size of each 
defendant subclass would not be required.
  Thus, 
concerns about class compensation are mollified, at least to 
the extent that non-liable copyright defendants are concerned.  
Defendants would not need to show that they did not infringe, 
but rather that they were not liable because a valid affirmative 
defense was available. 
64
                                                     
62 See, e.g., In re Dato, 99 F.2d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1938) (“‘in legal effect, the 
defendant becomes plaintiff, and the plaintiff becomes defendant.’” (quoting 
Stewart v. Gorham, 122 Iowa 669, 676 (1904))). 
  Instead of 
binding the entire defendant class to a settlement or judgment, 
the use of counterclaims to launch declaratory judgments 
against the common plaintiff would reverse the procedural 
posture, allowing defendants to opt-in to a counterclaim 
instead of requiring them to opt-out of a class defense.  
Subclass affirmative defenses could be raised based on 
specific factual situations of lead defendants, with any future 
63 See, e.g., Riviera Distribs., Inc. v. Jones, 2008 WL 441762 (7th Cir. 2008).  
The Seventh Circuit has also held that the prevailing party is presumptively 
entitled to attorney’s fees.  Woodhaven Homes & Realty, Inc. v. Hotz, 396 F.3d 
822, 824 (7th Cir. 2005).   
64 See, e.g., Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d 638, 645 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(stating that speculative or conclusory representations as to the size of a class 
may suffice when money damages are not sought).   
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 009 
class members who have the same facts then being able to 
resolve their cases based on these prior judgments.65  
However, certain defenses, such as copyright misuse, are only 
affirmative defenses and could not be the basis for affirmative 
relief.66
 
 These could not be counterclaims even if styled as a 
declaratory judgment.   
CONCLUSION 
¶41 On February 28, 2007, the RIAA began a new end-
user strategy.  Instead of filing John Doe complaints, 
hundreds of “pre-litigation” letters were distributed each 
month to the physical address corresponding with the IP 
addresses of accused infringers.67  The settlement terms 
offered are consistent with those offered during the John Doe 
litigation: a form settlement for a non-negotiable amount, 
typically around $3,000.68  With this method, the RIAA saves 
the cost of filing complaints, avoids oversight of federal 
judges, and achieves nearly the same result.  In the first year, 
the RIAA sent more than 5,400 letters and allegedly collected 
millions of dollars in settlement monies, outside the federal 
court system.69
                                                     
65 Defendant class counsel would administer this system, and be able to collect 
administration fees from the RIAA plaintiffs each time the plaintiff brought a 
case which was based on similar facts to a situation already adjudged to be 
protected by an affirmative defense.   
  Recipients of these letters could, of course, 
forgo settlement and choose to litigate. However, many of 
them had negative expected value suits, and would thus 
choose to settle outside the court system even if they had a 
valid defense.   
66 Maverick Recording Co. v. Chowdhury, No. CV-07-640(DGT), 2008 WL 
3884350, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2008) (“[C]opyright misuse is not a basis for 
affirmative relief.”). 
67 Eliot Van Buskirk, A Poison Pen from the RIAA, WIRED, Feb. 28, 2007, 
available at http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/02/72834; 
Thomas Mennecke, RIAA Announces New Campus Lawsuit Strategy, SLYCK, 
Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.slyck.com/story1422.html. 
68 Ken Fisher, Students largely ignore RIAA instant settlement offers, ARS 
TECHNICA, March 26, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2007/03/students-largely-ignore-riaa-instant-settlement-offers.ars. 
69 RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, Whitepaper, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-years-
later#footnote75_wr833h5. 
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¶42 Finally, at the end of 2008, the RIAA announced it 
would not bring any new end-user cases, although the cases 
currently filed will continue forward.70
 
  Whether this marks 
the end of RIAA litigation, similar litigation patterns will 
likely continue in the future with intellectual property 
proprietors suing masses of dispersed defendants, and many 
valid claims will be settled on unjust terms unless defendants 
are permitted an aggregation device such as a class defense.   
 
                                                     
70 Thomas Mennecke, RIAA Drops Lawsuit Campaign – Mostly, SLYCK, 
December 19, 2008, available at  
http://www.slyck.com/story1812_RIAA_Drops_Lawsuit_Campaign_Mostly. 
